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Abstract 
Entrepreneurship and business creation is a priority area for many governments 
worldwide. Public administration can help to promote entrepreneurship through its 
decisions and the definition and implementation of public policies. This study analyzes 
the effect of six dimensions of quality of governance in business creation. We used panel 
data for a sample of 206 countries over the period of 2004 to 2014, divided into four 
subsamples generated from the income level of the countries. Furthermore, the study 
adopted a dual perspective, considering both immediate effects and delayed effects, 
resulting in two research hypotheses. The results show that for high-income countries, 
the political stability and absence of violence variable is significant. Adopting two-year 
lags in the statistical model resulted in a greater number of statistically significant 
explanatory variables. No homogeneous pattern is observed in the variables for 
statistical significance regarding the four income levels. This finding implies that the focus 
on good governance should primarily be regarded as a long-term perspective, rather 
than in terms of short cycles or simply electoral cycles. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, economic, political and social changes have highlighted the role of 
business creation. A wide range of scientific papers has studied the economic effect of 
entrepreneurship, in particular in relation to employment and economic growth (Anokhin, 
Grichnik, & Hisrich, 2008; Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; Minniti & Levesque, 2008; 
Naudé, 2010), as well as its influence on the development and well-being of societies 
(Acs, Desai, & Hessels, 2008a; Amorós & Bosma, 2013). This has made it possible to 
perceive the importance of business creation, considered by many as a strategic vector 
in the definition of growth and development policies. 
From a research perspective, one of the main issues is identifying the determinants of 
entrepreneurship. The term “governance” has recently become a key element in 
government and corporate policies and is used to characterize the process and 
institutions by which authority is exercised in a country (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Matruzzi, 
2010; Ong, 2006). In this context, good governance has been related to transparency, 
the rule of law, efficient public services and civil rights, among other aspects (World 
Bank, 2013). 
 
In this study, we try to understand the determinants underlying the creation of firms at a 
global level. In particular, we focus on the role played by the quality of governance, 
understood as the ability demonstrated by a government and the respective public 
institutions to provide services and to develop and apply rules. 
 
To obtain solid conclusions concerning the role of the quality of governance in the 
creation of new companies, we used a large sample, encompassing more than 200 
countries around the world, using as a reference the database created by the World 
Bank. A set of six governance indicators for the period 2004–2014 were included, and 
panel data analysis was applied. To identify the effects of the quality of governance on 
the creation of companies, we considered both the immediate and the delayed effects. 
Furthermore, we sought to determine if the income level of the countries is a key factor 
in this explanation, filling a research gap on the subject of entrepreneurship. With the 
objective of including the different environments of the countries, we formed four groups 
of countries with homogeneous characteristics in relation to their income level. 
 
This paper is divided into five main sections. Section 2 provides a literature review, 
discussing the role of the quality of governance in the creation of new businesses. In the 
third section, the methodology is described, addressing the data, variables and statistical 
models. In section 4, we present and analyze the statistical results obtained on the basis 
of univariate and multivariate approaches. Finally, section 6 presents the primary findings 
and highlights the most important aspects of this research, as well as future lines of 
research in this area. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Human behavior is influenced by the institutional environment. Thus, entrepreneurship 
also depends on institutional factors, which can restrict or encourage the creation of new 
firms (Ajzen, 1991). In this area, several researchers have proposed the use of 
institutional factors to understand entrepreneurship (Álvarez, Urbano, Coduras, & Ruiz, 
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2011; Salimath & Cullen, 2010; Thornton, Ribeiro-Soriano, & Urbano, 2011). Acs, Desai, 
& Klapper (2008b) and Thai and Turkana (2014) propose that entrepreneurship plays an 
important role in introducing changes to the economy, and therefore it is useful for those 
responsible for policy to understand the factors that drive entrepreneurs to set up 
businesses (Thai & Turkana, 2014). The identification of institutional barriers to the 
creation of new businesses will not only contribute to a better understanding of the 
current situation, but will also help in developing policies designed to promote and 
stimulate entrepreneurship. In the same vein, Wennekers, Uhlaner, and Thurik (2002) 
and Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) argue for the importance of governance in promoting 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Through a review of the literature on entrepreneurship, Gedeon (2010) concludes that 
the level of entrepreneurship varies systematically among countries around the world. 
For their part, McMillan and Woodruff (2002) and Bettignies and Brander (2007) argue 
that economic and institutional conditions are important determinants for the 
development of entrepreneurship. However, the promotion of entrepreneurship requires 
effective governance that is sustainable and adopts a long-term perspective (Gugler & 
Chaisse, 2009). In focusing on improving the quality of governance, governments can 
take a diverse range of actions to promote entrepreneurship. However, in the case of 
countries that are characterized by low levels of economic development, these actions 
may be less viable because the regulatory framework in these countries is generally 
weak (Thai & Turkina, 2014). This raises questions about the ability of such countries to 
protect entrepreneurs against corruption, which can lead them to operate in the informal 
sector (Dreher & Schneider, 2010). 
 
Multiple studies have concluded that there is a positive relationship between the quality 
of governance and certain indicators related to economic well-being: the rate of human 
development assessed by the United Nations Development Programme (Rose-
Ackerman, 2004), the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Kaufmann & 
Kraay, 2003) and entrepreneurship (Amorós & Masferrer, 2010; Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2014; Grosanu, Bota-Avram, Rachisan, Vesselinov, & Tiron-Tudor, 2015; Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006; Thai & Turkina, 2014). Moreover, Klapper, Amit, Guillén, & 
Quesada (2007) conclude that there is a similar relationship between good governance 
and entrepreneurship. 
 
A common element in most of the studies carried out on the effect of governance on 
entrepreneurship is the adoption of so-called governance quality indicators, developed 
within the scope of the “Worldwide Governance Indicators” project and disseminated by 
the World Bank. These indicators were created by Kaufmann et al. (2010) and consider 
six dimensions: voice and accountability; political stability and the absence of 
violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; the rule of law; and 
control of corruption. Examples of the application of this methodology include research 
by Thai and Turkina (2014) and Klapper and Love (2010). 
 
Thai and Turkina (2014) conclude that governance’s impact on the development of 
entrepreneurship is limited. Similarly, based on a study of the relationship between 
several indicators of governance and business creation over the period 2004–2009, 
Klapper and Love (2010) found that none of these indicators showed statistical 
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significance. According to them, this may be because governance is a slow-moving 
variable, giving reason to believe that improvements in this variable are only observed 
over longer periods of time, and also because the study considers a time interval of six 
years, which may be insufficient to record significant changes in governance quality 
indicators. 
 
Considering the contradictory results obtained in previous studies on this topic, it seems 
necessary to develop a new study, exploring new methods and extending the sample 
studied to obtain more solid conclusions. Therefore, based on the analysis of the results 
obtained in previous studies, the following research hypotheses are defined: 
 
H1: The various dimensions of governance have an immediate effect on the creation of 
new enterprises in countries of different income groups. 
 
H2: The various dimensions of governance have a delayed effect on the creation of new 
enterprises in countries of different income groups. 
 
Methodology 
 
Sample 
 
To test the hypotheses of this study, we employed a sample with data for 206 countries. 
The sample is drawn from two World Bank databases. Figure 1 illustrates the process of 
elaboration. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of sampling process 
 
The first of the databases, based on the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey, 
contains annual information for 247 countries concerning the number of new businesses 
registered over the period 2004–2014. The second, the Worldwide Governance 
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Indicators (WGI) database, provides aggregate and individual governance indicators for 
215 economies over the period 1996–2014.  
 
The final study sample only included data from those countries available in both 
databases (206). Regarding the period of study, all of the years available for the measure 
of entrepreneurial activity (2004–2014) were included, whereas for the governance 
indicators, the period was limited to 2002–2014, taking into account the lags used in the 
econometric analysis. 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Density 
 
As in Grosanu et al. (2015) and Klapper and Love (2010), in this work entrepreneurship 
is measured through the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey, understood as the 
number of new limited liability firms registered in the calendar year per 1,000 people 
aged 15 to 64 years. Following Grosanu et al. (2015), a logarithmic transformation has 
been applied to the dependent variable. 
 
Independent Variables: Governance 
 
In this study, as in Amorós and Masferrer (2010), Grosanu et al. (2015) and Klapper and 
Love (2010), we used as regressors the six dimensions of governance or governance 
quality indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) for the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators project: control of corruption (CC); political stability and lack of 
violence/terrorism (PV); regulatory quality (RQ; rule of law (RL); voice and accountability 
(VA); and government effectiveness (GE). 
 
Each of the six indicators has scores ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with the highest scores 
reflecting higher governance (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Figure 2 presents the definition of 
each variable.  
 
Control Variable: GDP Per Capita 
 
As macroeconomic control variable, we used the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, 
using purchasing power parity (PPP) to control for the possible effect of the general level 
of development of the country (Klapper & Love, 2010). 
 
Model Specification 
 
This study employed panel data methodology. Assuming that countries are 
heterogeneous, i.e., that each has its own individual behavior, panel data can control for 
unobservable heterogeneity. The basic specification of our model is given by the 
following equation: 
 
DENSITYit = β1 CCit+ β2 GEit + β3 PVit + β4 RLit + β5 RQit + β6 VAit+ β7 GDPit + αi + λt + εit 
[Model 1] 
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where the variable αi controls the individual invariant effect over time (unobserved 
heterogeneity) of the countries, parameter λt represents temporal dummies that aim to 
gather global macroeconomic variables common to all countries that change over time 
(oil prices, interest rates, etc.) and εit is the random perturbation.  
 
Figure 2: Definition of independent variables 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
 
In addition, to test Hypothesis 2, one- and two-year lags are included for the independent 
variables of governance (CC, GE, PV, RL, RQ and VA), as well as the control variable 
(GDP), that is, variables are incorporated into t-1 (Model 2) and t-2 (Model 3): 
 
DENSITYit = β1 CCit-1+ β2 GEit-1 + β3 PVit-1 + β4 RLit-1 + β5 RQit-1 + β6 VAit-1+ β7 GDPit-1 + αi 
+ λt + εit  
[Model 2] 
 
DENSITYit = β1 CCit-2+ β2 GEit-2 + β3 PVit-2 + β4 RLit-2 + β5 RQit-2 + β6 VAit-2+ β7 GDPit-2 + αi 
+ λt + εit  
[Model 3] 
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To estimate these two models, the fixed effects (intragroup) estimator was used, 
including the individual effects of the country and years and the standard errors grouped 
at the country level (vce (robust)). 
 
Finally, each of the three models proposed (Models 1, 2 and 3) was replicated for each 
of the four groups of countries established according to their income level (ANNEX 1) in 
order to test the existence of differences between these groups. 
 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
This section comprises two sub-sections. In the first, a descriptive analysis of the 
variables used in this work is provided. In the second, the results obtained after applying 
the models previously defined are presented. 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
This analysis is similar to that in Klapper and Love (2010). Given that, in the subsequent 
multivariate analysis, the values of the independent and lagged (one and two years) 
control variables are used, the descriptive statistics of these variables have been 
calculated considering the period 2002–2014. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics 
of the dependent variable and the independent and control variables. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Average Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
DENSITY1 1119 3.245 4.737 0.002 44.130 
CC 2599 -0.028 1.003 -1.924 2.553 
GE 2593 -0.027 1.000 -2.480 2.430 
PV 2616 -0.035 1.001 -3.324 1.938 
RL 2628 -0.034 0.998 -2.669 2.121 
RQ 2592 -0.028 0.997 -2.675 2.231 
VA 2628 -0.029 1.003 -2.284 1.826 
GDP1 2431 15780.01 18853.07 405.48 140649.20 
NOTE: 1 variable is not in logarithm 
 
On average, over three new businesses (3.245) are created per 1000 people aged 15–
64 years. However, the results show important differences in the average density of new 
business creation among income groups. Figure 3 shows the average values of the entry 
density of new companies for the period and the income levels considered. 
 
The data by income level (Figure 3) show average entry density rates for the period 
2004–2014, ranging from more than five companies (5.57) in countries with high income 
levels to less than one company in countries at the middle-low (0.87) and low (0.25) 
levels. At the high-income level, more than five new companies are created annually per 
1000 individuals of working age, whereas in the low-income group, only one company is 
registered per 4000 people of working age. 
 
Rodríguez-Gulías, M.J., de Sousa Gabriel, V.M. & Rodeiro-Pazos, D. (2017) Immediate And Delayed Effect Of Governance In Entrepreneurship: An 
Analysis By Country Income Level, Vol.9(1): 83-98 
90 
Figure 3: Average density of new business creation by income level (2004–2014) 
 
In addition, Figure 4 shows the evolution of the mean input density by region over the 
study period. 
 
Figure 4: Average density evolution of new business creation by income level (2004–
2014) 
 
In the period 2004–2014, the annual rate of new companies was always higher at the 
high-income level, followed by the medium-high, medium-low and low levels, in this 
order. In addition, all income levels follow a positive trend in terms of the average annual 
rate except for the medium-high income level. This latter group appears to be unable to 
recover from the fall suffered in 2007, which also seems to affect countries in the high-
income level, although in this group there is a recovery from 2010 that leads to closing 
values for the period above those in 2007. 
 
Data for the independent variables in Table 1 show negative mean values for the six 
measures of governance during the period 2002–2014. The indicator with the highest 
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mean is government effectiveness (GE) at -0.027, and the indicator with the lowest mean 
is political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PV) at -0.035. However, as with 
the dependent variable, the governance indicators show significant differences between 
income levels (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Average of governance variables by income level (2004–2014) 
 
Considering the income groups (Figure 5), only the high-income level presents positive 
average values for all governance indicators. The remaining income groups (medium-
high, middle-low and low) show negative values for all measures of governance, such 
that the lower the income level is, the lower the values are. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
This section shows the results of the estimations using the fixed effects estimator under 
the specifications provided previously. In particular, Table 2 shows the results of the 
estimations analyzing the possible immediate effect of the different measures of 
governance (CC, GE, PV, RL, RQ and VA) on the density of entry of new firms by income 
group (Models 1.A, 1.B, 1.C and 1.D), i.e., without delay, related to Hypothesis 1. The 
models in Table 3 (Models 2.A, 2.B, 2.C and 2.D) do the same but consider the possibility 
of delayed impact using the one-year lagged independent variables (t-1). Finally, the 
models in Table 4 (Models 3.A, 3.B, 3.C and 3.D) incorporate a lag of two years (t-2). 
Models 2 and 3, in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively, relate to Hypothesis 2. All models 
include the control variable (GDP) (without a lag, with a one-year and with a two-year lag 
in Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively) and the dummy variables that control for the temporal 
effect. 
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Table 2: Immediate effect of governance on entrepreneurship by income level 
 MODEL 1.A MODEL 1.B MODEL 1.C MODEL 1.D 
INCOME LEVEL HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW LOW  
CC -0.091 -0.428 0.052 0.241 
 
(0.127) (0.252) (0.179) (0.712) 
GE 0.044 0.227 0.331 0.803 
 
(0.166) (0.297) (0.211) (0.863) 
PV -0.216* -0.242 -0.07 -0.079 
 
(0.100) (0.175) (0.048) (0.270) 
RL -0.028 0.084 -0.489 -0.058 
 
(0.235) (0.343) (0.293) (0.721) 
RQ 0.248 0.178 0.235 0.102 
 
(0.180) (0.189) (0.199) (0.463) 
VA 0.116 -0.068 -0.151 0.706 
 
(0.248) (0.215) (0.267) (0.457) 
GPP 1.201*** 0.420 1.869*** 0.878 
 
(0.229) (0.646) (0.480) (0.796) 
_cons -11.461*** -3.476 -16.353*** -6.054 
 
(2.410) (6.126) (4.176) (5.976) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 401 321 258 107 
Countries 45 39 32 16 
R2 0.258 0.078 0.437 0.467 
F-test 15.96*** 29.68*** 20.79***  
Standard Robust errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
The results for Model 1 (Table 2) do not show any immediate significant effect of the 
governance indicators on the entry density for the medium-high (Model 1.B), medium-
low (Model 1 .C) or low (Model 1.D) income level groups. However, for the group of high-
income countries (Model 1.A), there is a negative effect of political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism (PV) on the rate of entrepreneurship. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
validated only for the set of countries with higher levels of income in relation to political 
stability. 
 
The results for a delayed effect (by one year) of the quality of governance on 
entrepreneurship (Model 2, Table 3) are in line with those obtained for the non-lagged 
model (Model 1, Table 2). Specifically, the immediate negative effect of political stability 
on the entry density of new companies in the group of high-income countries is 
maintained one year later (Model 2.A), thus validating Hypothesis 2 only for this group 
of countries and variable. 
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Table 3: Delayed effect of governance on entrepreneurship by level of income (1-year 
lag) 
 MODEL 2.A MODEL 2.B MODEL 2.C MODEL 2.D 
INCOME LEVEL HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW LOW  
CC -0.126 -0.205 -0.066 -0.447 
 
(0.148) (0.318) (0.188) (0.574) 
GE 0.131 -0.228 0.278 1.44 
 
(0.137) (0.334) (0.225) (0.696) 
PV -0.215* -0.111 -0.054 0.541 
 
(0.102) (0.131) (0.095) (0.267) 
RL -0.073 0.222 -0.193 0.036 
 
(0.197) (0.280) (0.251) (0.527) 
RQ 0.271 0.094 -0.02 -0.284 
 
(0.205) (0.183) (0.197) (0.659) 
VA 0.102 -0.265 -0.068 -0.208 
 
(0.216) (0.239) (0.198) (0.498) 
GPP 0.948*** 0.038 1.718** -0.242 
 
(0.216) (0.677) (0.583) (1.462) 
_cons -8.784*** 0.254 -15.060** 1.841 
 
(2.260) (6.405) (5.018) (10.593) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 402 320 257 106 
Countries 45 39 32 16 
R2 0.219 0.054 0.408 0.515 
F-test 12.5*** 5.47*** 16.88*** . 
Standard robust errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
When the lag applied to the independent variables is extended to two years (Model 3, 
Table 4), new significant variables appear. In particular, there are positive effects from 
government effectiveness (GE) in high-income countries (Model 3.A), rule of law (RL) in 
middle-income countries (Model 3.B) and political stability (PV) in low-income countries 
(Model 3.D). These results partially confirm Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 4: Delayed effect of governance on entrepreneurship by level of income (2-year 
lag) 
 
MODEL 3.A MODEL 3.B MODEL 3.C MODEL 3.D 
INCOME LEVEL HIGH MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW LOW  
CC -0.216 -0.171 0.028 -0.203 
 
(0.155) (0.280) (0.167) (0.422) 
GE 0.297* -0.238 0.183 1.235 
 
(0.143) (0.324) (0.213) (0.591) 
PV -0.186 -0.009 -0.064 0.506* 
 
(0.109) (0.110) (0.128) (0.172) 
RL 0.096 0.610* -0.108 -0.003 
 
(0.193) (0.276) (0.285) (0.442) 
RQ 0.182 -0.15 -0.142 -0.441 
 
(0.204) (0.201) (0.168) (0.704) 
VA 0.087 -0.449 0.115 -0.635 
 
(0.203) (0.260) (0.212) (0.535) 
GPP 0.746** 0.241 1.374* -0.914 
 
(0.255) (0.565) (0.631) (1.719) 
_cons -6.838* -1.584 -12.032* 6.234 
 
(2.613) (5.334) (5.421) (12.266) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 402 318 256 105 
Countries 45 39 32 15 
R2 0.218 0.118 0.381 0.512 
F-test 10.89*** 3.66*** 13.51*** . 
Standard robust errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Entrepreneurship and business creation represent a priority area for many governments 
worldwide. Public administration can promote entrepreneurship through its decisions and 
the definition and implementation of public policies. 
Our study analyzes the effect of governance on the creation of companies using panel 
data methodology applied to a sample of 206 countries over the period of 2004 to 2014 
using data from World Bank databases concerning the six dimensions of governance 
quality. To gain an understanding of the effect of the quality of governance on the density 
of new companies, a dual perspective was adopted, giving rise to two research 
hypotheses. The first posited an immediate effect of governance on entrepreneurship, 
and the second suggested a delayed effect. In both cases, the selected methodology 
was applied to four subsamples, generated from the income levels of the countries, 
closely following the proposal of Klapper and Love (2010). 
For countries with high incomes, the results show that the variable political 
stability/absence of violence has greater statistical significance, either in contemporary 
terms or with a delay of a single period, suggesting that maintaining conditions that 
reduce the likelihood of political instability, violence or terrorism can be a determining 
factor in the creation of companies in these countries. Moreover, these results also 
suggest that this variable may be less slow moving compared to the remaining variables, 
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so that citizens, entrepreneurs and investors quickly react to phenomena of instability 
and violence, which is reflected in the level of business creation. 
 
Adopting a two-year lag in the statistical model, a greater number of explanatory 
variables become statistically significant. In high-income countries, the effectiveness of 
governance is shown to be statistically significant, whereas in the middle-high and low-
income countries there is statistical significance for the variables regulatory quality and 
political stability. There is no homogeneous pattern in the variables with statistical 
significance regarding the four income levels. The results obtained are partially 
compatible with the opinion of Klapper and Love (2010), according to which the 
dimensions of governance seem to be slow-moving in terms of their impact, so their 
effects must be examined over longer periods of time. This implies that the focus on good 
governance should be considered primarily from a long-term perspective, rather than 
following the logic of short cycles or simply electoral cycles. Therefore, we believe that 
the results of this study can have important implications for policymakers and for 
companies in general. 
 
Future research should increase the number of lags in the statistical model to gain a 
better understanding of the long-term effects of governance on entrepreneurship and 
create new subsamples of countries considering the degree of government intervention 
in countries’ economies. 
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ANNEX 1: COUNTRIES BY INCOME GROUP 
HIGH  MEDIUM-HIGH MEDIUM-LOW LOW 
Andorra Israel Sweden Albania Marshall Islands Armenia Pakistan Afghanistan 
Antigua and Barbuda Italy Switzerland Algeria Mauritius Bangladesh Papua New Guinea Benin 
Argentina Japan Trinidad and Tobago American Samoa Mexico Bhutan Philippines Burkina Faso 
Aruba Jersey, Channel Islands 
United Arab 
Emirates Angola Mongolia Bolivia Samoa Burundi 
Australia Korea, Rep. United Kingdom Azerbaijan Montenegro Cabo Verde Sao Tome and Principe Cambodia 
Austria Kuwait United States Belarus Namibia Cameroon Senegal Central African Republic 
Bahamas, The Latvia Uruguay Belize Palau Congo, Rep. Solomon Islands Chad 
Bahrain Liechtenstein Venezuela, RB Bosnia and Herzegovina Panama Cote d'Ivoire Sri Lank Comoros 
Barbados Lithuania Virgin Islands (U.S.) Botswana Paraguay Djibouti Sudan Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Belgium Luxembourg  Brazil Peru Egypt, Arab Rep. Swaziland Eritrea 
Bermuda Macao SAR, China  Bulgaria Romania El Salvador Syrian Arab Republic Ethiopia 
Brunei Darussalam Malta  China Serbia Georgia Tajikistan Gambia, The 
Canada Monaco  Colombia South Africa Ghana Timor-Leste Guinea 
Cayman Islands Netherlands  Costa Rica St. Lucia Guatemala Ukraine Guinea-Bissau 
Chile New Caledonia  Cuba St. Vincent and the Grenadines Guyana Uzbekistan Haiti 
Croatia New Zealand  Dominica Suriname Honduras Vanuatu Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Cyprus Norway  Dominican Republic Thailand India Vietnam Liberia 
Czech Republic Oman  Ecuador Tonga Indonesia West Bank and Gaza Madagascar 
Denmark Poland  Fiji Tunisia Kenya Yemen, R Malawi 
Equatorial Guinea Portugal  Gabon Turkey Kiribati Zambia Mali 
Estonia Puerto Rico  Grenada Turkmenistan Kosovo  Mozambique 
Finland Qatar  Iran, Islamic Rep. Tuvalu Kyrgyz Republic  Nepal 
France Russian Federation  Iraq  Lao PDR  Niger 
Germany San Marino  Jamaica  Lesotho  Rwanda 
Greece Saudi Arabia  Jordan  Mauritania  Sierra Leone 
Greenland Seychelles  Kazakhstan  Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  Somalia 
Guam Singapore  Lebanon  Moldova  South Sudan 
Hong Kong SAR, China Slovak Republic  Libya  Morocco  Tanzania 
Hungary Slovenia  Macedonia, FYR  Myanmar  Togo 
Iceland Spain  Malaysia  Nicaragua  Uganda 
Ireland St. Kitts and Nevis  Maldives  Nigeria  Zimbabwe 
 
